Criminal Law - Asportation as an Essential Element of Larceny by D., J. S.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 5 | Number 2
May 1943
Criminal Law - Asportation as an Essential Element
of Larceny
J. S. D.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
J. S. D., Criminal Law - Asportation as an Essential Element of Larceny, 5 La. L. Rev. (1943)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol5/iss2/8
NOTES
to say that this decision repeals the divorce laws of all the states
and substitutes the law of Nevada as to all marriages one of the
parties to which can afford a short trip there." Mr. Justice Mur-
phy, also dissenting, raised a very pertinent question as to wheth-
er, in an appraisement of relative jurisdictional interests, those
of Nevada could fairly be said to prevail over those of North
Carolina.'7
It has been said that "the life of the law is its ability to ad-
just itself to changing social needs" and that "the law must neces-
sarily conform, to a large extent, to prevailing community stand-
ards."'8 These concepts will help to understand the overruling of
the Haddock case. In the thirty-six years which have elapsed since
Haddock v. Haddock divorce statistics will show a steady increase
in the dissolution of marriages throughout the nation. Undoubt-
edly the Supreme Court was impressed with the necessity of
securing greater uniformity in regulation of the marital status, in
order to avoid the undesirable situation of having persons mar-
ried in one state and unmarried in the others. From such a situ-
ation serious social complications would necessarily arise.
Who can tell, however, but that this decision allowing the
spouse who has abandoned the other party to obtain a divorce
entitled to recognition will create even greater evils.
It is submitted that the advantages of uniformity were scarce-
ly a sufficient reason for thus sacrificing the right of the indi-
vidual states to govern the marital relations of their citizens. In
effect it tends to force the divorce standards of all states down to
the level of those jurisdictions which have chosen, for not too
laudable reasons, to make the dissolution of the marital status a
perfunctory matter.
R'R.A.
CRIMINAL LAW-ASPORTATION AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
LARCENY-Defendant was charged, under the cattle stealing act,'
17. As stated by Murphy, J., in the dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court
has "recognized an area of flexibility in the application of the clause to pre-
serve and protect state policies in matters of public concern. We have said
that conflicts between such state policies should be resolved 'not by giving
automatic effect to the full faith and credit clause . . . but by appraising the
governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision
according to their weight.'" Alaska Packer's Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Comm., 294 U.S. 532, 547, 55 S.Ct. 518, 527, 79 L.Ed. 1044, 1052 (1935).
18. Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce (1935) 2 Law & Comtemp.
Prob. 335, 341.
1. La. Act 64 of 1910 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1057].
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with larceny of a white-faced heifer. He sold the heifer, which
was grazing on a free range, and the vendee took posession im-
mediately. Several months later, while the same heifer was
grazing on the range, defendant sold it again. The second pur-
chaser, in perfect good faith, unaccompanied and unaided by the
defendant, carried it away. Held, defendant was not guilty of
larceny as the essential element of asportation was lacking, State
v. Laborde, 11 So. (2d) 404 (La. 1942).
The instant decision is important in that it is the first case
in which the question of asportation was ever squarely presented
to the Louisiana Supreme Court. It is a general requirement of
common law larceny that there be some "asportation" or "carry-
ing away," but it is sufficient if the property be entirely removed
from the place it occupied and be under the control of the taker
for only an instant.2  One state, Texas, has expressly abolished
this rule by statute
The Anglo-American courts have been very liberal in their
interpretation of what is sufficient to constitute an asportation.
They will, in most cases, find an asportation in the slightest move-
ment of the goods. Asportation was found where the accused
took several chickens from a coop and wrung their necks, and
then, upon being discovered, fled, leaving them on the premises.4
When accused killed a cow and removed the hind quarters, it was
held to constitute a larceny of the cow.5 In another similar case
evidence that accused tied up a hog's feet and mouth with the
intent of taking it, was held sufficient to show asportation.6 A
sufficient asportation was also found where the accused and two
others were dragging three sheep out of a field when accosted by
the owner.7 A Kentucky court implied the necessary asportation
element of larceny from the circumstances of wrongfully cut
2. Clark and Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes (4 ed. 1940) 421,
§ 320.
3. The larceny articles of the Texas Penal Code [Tex. Ann. Pen. Code
(Vernon, 1925) arts. 1410, 1412] expressly provide that there need only be a
fraudulent taking, and that there is no need for a removing of the object.
State v. Earp, 41 Tex. 487 (1874); Hartman v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. Rep. 582, 213
S.W. 936 (1919); Rosenbush, 136 Tex. Cr. Rep. 50, 122 S.W.(2d) 1071 (1938);
Commercial Casualty Co. v. Goode, 135 S.W.(2d) 816 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940);
Rountree v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. Rep. 188, 143 S.W.(2d) 942 (1940).
4. People v. Ostrosky, 95 Misc. 104, 160 N.Y. Supp. 493 (1916). Similarly,
the crime of larceny was complete at the time the chickens were taken from
the roost and put into a sack, regardless of the fact that upon taking them
the defendant was shot before he removed the chickens from the premises.
Warnke v. State, 87 Ind. App. 683, 167 N.E. 138 (1929).
5. Davis v. State, 41 Ariz. 12, 15 P.(2d) 242 (1932).
6. Reynolds v. State, 199 Ark. 961, 136 S.W. 1028 (1940).
7. State v. Priestly, 97 Utah 158, 91 P.(2d) 447 (1939).
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timber being found on accused's premises.8 Thus it might be said
that in most cases the court will "bend over backwards" to find
an asportation. However, if the property is not, at least for a
monent, in the entire control of the taker there is no asportation;
as where the accused compels A to lay down his bundle but is
frightened away before he can seize it,9 where accused knocks
money from A's hand,10 or where defendant attempted to steal an
overcoat on a dummy secured by a chain.1 Similarly, the asporta-
tion is lacking if the defendant, although having taken possession
of the goods, has not moved them. Thus where defendant kills
an animal and partly skins it, thereby taking possession of it,
but not having begun to remove it, there is no asportation.1
"Asportation" or,,"carrying away" usually implies force, such as
may be required in removing the article stolen or taking it into
possession; but in some cases fraud may take the place of force.
So the enticing of an animal away by food may be as much a
taking as if the animal were hauled away. 3
It has generally been held that the asportation may be by
means of an innocent third party. The leading case for such a
doctrine is Commonwealth v. Barry,4 where defendant was con-
victed of larceny when he switched checks on a baggage trunk,
thus causing the trunk to go on the same train with his accom-
plice. Likewise, a defendant was convicted of larceny of tubs
of butter when he changed the address on the refrigerator car,
and the butter was subsequently delivered to him as addressee.
The railroad company was said to be the innocent agent of the
defendant.'5 It has also been held to constitute. larceny where a
defendant pointed out a hog and sold it as his own, and the pur-
8. Griffin v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 178, 298 S.W. 390 (1927).
9. State v. Jones, 65 N.C. 358 (1871).
10. Thompson v. State, 94 Ala. 535, 10 So. 520 (1892).
11. People v. Meyer, 75 Cal. 383, 17 Pac. 431 (1888).
12. Molton v. State, 105 Ala. 18, 16 So. 796 (1895); Williams v. State, 63
Miss. 58 (1885); State v. Alexander, 74 N.C. 232 (1876). Contra: State v. Nel-
son, 121 W.Va. 310, 3 S.E. (2d) 530 (1939), where accused was caught and con-
victed of larceny just after killing two hogs and not moving them. Meador v.
State, 201 Ark. 1083, 148 S.W. (2d) 653 (1941), tying a heifer in the woods out
of sight of a highway was held larceny. Driggers v. State, 96 Fla. 232, 118 So.
20 (1928), held larceny where defendant entered inclosure of another and
shot down a cow. Davis v. State, 97 Fla. 987, 122 So. 579 (1929), held larceny
where defendant was accosted while butchering cow at place where it was
shot.
13. 2 Bishop, Criminal Law (1923) § 806; Reg. v. Simpson, 29 Eng. L. &
Eq. 530, Dears 421, 18 Jur. 1030 (1854). Contra: Edmonds v. State, 70 Ala. 8,
45 Am. Rep. 67 (1881).
14. 125 Mass. 390 (1878).




chaser took it away in good faith; 6 and where defendant claimed
an impounded animal and sold it to a third party, who took it
away. 17 There is a split of authority on this question, however,
and a number of courts have refused to recognize an asportation
by an innocent third party as sufficient. Thus where accused sold
a bull belonging to another, and the purchaser subsequently took
the bull away in the absence of the accused, it was held that there
was no asportation.18 In another case it was held that there was
no asportation by one who sold property which did not belong to
him, and the property was hauled away by the purchaser. 9 This
latter more restrictive view appears to have been adopted in the
principal case, wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court refuses to
hold that the asportation requirement may be met by the act of
an innocent purchaser of the heifer.
Under the theft article of the new Criminal Code the crimes
of larceny, embezzlement and obtaining goods by false pretences
are consolidated. "Theft is the misappropriation or taking of
anything of value which belongs to another. 2 0 All types of steal-
ing cases are to come under this provision, and with the unquali-
fied use of the word taking, Louisiana courts may construe the
articles as eliminating the generally essential element of larceny
-asportation; and Justice Higgins so indicates in his opinion in
the Laborde decision when he declares that in the present case,
"the Court was not referred to any statute of Louisiana which
dispensed with asportation as one of the essential elements of
the crime of theft or larceny. The transaction between the ac-
cused and Jeansonne having taken place on June 15, 1939,
obviously the Louisiana Criminal Code, Act 43 of 1942, and
particularly Article 67 thereof, is inapplicable. Consequently,
under the law of this state, asportation of the alleged stolen
property is necessary in order to constitute the crime of larceny
or theft."'2 1 Giving full effect to possible implications of this
dictum statement, it may be suggested that the offender would
have been found guilty of "Theft" if his offense had been com-
mitted subsequent to the enactment of the Criminal Code. As a
16. Cummins v. Commonwealth, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 200, 12 Ky. Op. 215 (1883).
17. State v. Hunt, 45 Iowa 673 (1877). Contra: People v. Gillis, 6 Utah 84,
21 Pac. 404 (1889).
18. Ridgel v. State, 110 Ark. 606, 162 S.W. 773 (1914).
19. Henderson v. State, 79 Ark. 333, 916 S.W. 359, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 816
(1906).
20. Art. 67, La. Crim. Code.
21. 11 So.(2d) 404, 406 (La. 1942).
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practical matter, the mere fact that the purchaser, rather than
the defendant, hauled the heifer away should not preclude the
defendant's criminal liability.
J.S.D.
CRIMINAL LAW-BRIBERY OF A PUBLIC OFFIcER-Defendant, a
city policeman, accepted one hundred dollars upon the pretense
and representation that he could and would improperly influence
the official action of a municipal officer of the city. Defendant
was convicted of bribery and appealed urging that he, being a
policeman, was not a municipal officer, but merely an employee
of the city, and thus was not within the statute making it an
offense to accept a bribe under color of office. The decision of the
lower court was affirmed. State v. Sheffield, 10 So. (2d) 894
(La. 1942).
Originally the offense of bribery was limited to the offering
or giving of a reward to a judge or other person concerned in
the administration of public justice; but the offense was subse-
quently broadened so as to include the receiving or offering of
a reward by or to any person in a public office to influence his
official behavior. Modern statutes cover the bribery of all per-
sons whose official conduct is in any way connected with the ad-
ministration of government, whether general or local, judicial,
legislative or executive.1 Bribery in Louisiana was formerly
covered by numerous conflicting and confusing statutes. In 1878,
however, the legislature enacted a general bribery statute which
was for the purpose of punishing anyone who should offer or
give a bribe, present, or reward to any public officer of the state
with the intent to induce or influence such officer to show par-
tiality or favor contrary to law in the performance of his duty.
The statute also included the asking for or receiving of a bribe.2
These modern statutes were of a comprehensive nature, yet
in some cases they did not appear to be as inclusive as the crim-
inal activity they sought to prescribe. Only public officers were
included, and the question often arose as to whether the accused,
in fulfilling his duty as a public servant, could be designated a
1. Clark and Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes (4 ed. 1940) 594,
434.
2. La. Act 59 of 1878, as amended by La. Act 162 of 1920, and partly re-
pealed by La. Act 78 of 1890, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 796]. See redac-
tor's "Comment on Former Statutes," La. Crim. Code (1942) 121.
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